Daniel Dennett

Daniel Clement Dennett (born 1942) is an American philosopher, and a leading figure in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science, particularly as those fields relate to evolutionary biology and cognitive science. He is presently (2003) employed as Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy and director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University.

Dennett's research centres on the philosophy of the mind and cognitive science. He is the author of several major books on evolution and consciousness. He is a leading proponent of the theory known by some as Neural Darwinism (see also greedy reductionism).

He is also well known for his argument against qualia, which claims that the concept is so confused that it cannot be put to any use or understood in any non-contradictory way, and therefore does not constitute a valid refutation of physicalism. This argument was presented most comprehensively in his book Consciousness Explained.

Table of contents
1 Selected works
2 Texts on Dennett
3 Quotation
4 See also
5 External links

Selected works

Texts on Dennett

Quotation

A quote from Chapter 25 of Brain Children that is fundamental to understanding Dennett's work:
"The first stable conclusion I reached … was that the only thing brains could do was to approximate the responsivity to meanings that we presuppose in our everyday mentalistic discourse. When mechanical push comes to shove, a brain was always going to do what it was caused to do by current, local, mechanical circumstances, whatever it ought to do, whatever a God's-eye view might reveal about the actual meaning of its current states. But over the long haul, brains could be designed - by evolutionary processes - to do the right thing (from the point of view of meaning) with high reliability. … [B]rains are syntactic engines that can mimic the competence of semantic engines. … The appreciation of meanings - their discrimination and delectation - is central to our vision of consciousness, but this conviction that I, on the inside, deal directly with meanings turns out to be something rather like a benign "user-illusion".

See also

External links


This article is part of The Contemporary Philosophers series
Analytic philosophers:
Simon Blackburn | Ned Block | David Chalmers | Patricia Churchland | Paul Churchland | Donald Davidson | Daniel Dennett | Jerry Fodor | Susan Haack | Jaegwon Kim | Saul Kripke | Thomas Samuel Kuhn | Bryan Magee | Ruth Barcan Marcus | Colin McGinn | Thomas Nagel | Robert Nozick | Alvin Plantinga | Karl Popper | Hilary Putnam | W. V. Quine | John Rawls | Richard Rorty | Roger Scruton | Peter Singer | John Searle | Charles Taylor
Continental philosophers:
Louis Althusser | Giorgio Agamben | Roland Barthes | Jean Baudrillard | Isaiah Berlin | Maurice Blanchot | Pierre Bourdieu | Hélène Cixous | Guy Debord | Gilles Deleuze | Jacques Derrida | Michel Foucault | Hans-Georg Gadamer | Jürgen Habermas | Werner Hamacher | Julia Kristeva | Henri Lefebvre | Claude Lévi-Strauss | Emmanuel Levinas | Jean-François Lyotard | Paul de Man | Jean-Luc Nancy | Antonio Negri | Paul Ricoeur | Michel Serres | Paul Virilio | Slavoj Žižek






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